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Abstract
Safety-critical systems are becoming more widespread, complex and reliant on
software. Increasingly they are engineered through Commercial Oﬀ The Shelf
(COTS) (Commercial Oﬀ The Shelf) components to alleviate the spiralling costs
and development time, often in the context of complex supply chains.
A parallel increased concern for safety has resulted in a variety of safety
standards, with a growing consensus that a safety life cycle is needed which
is fully integrated with the design and development life cycle, to ensure that
safety has appropriate inﬂuence on the design decisions as system development
progresses.
In this article we explore the application of an integrated approach to safety
engineering in which assurance drives the engineering process. The paper re-
ports on the outcome of a case study on a live industrial project with a view to
evaluate: its suitability for application in a real-world safety engineering setting;
its beneﬁts and limitations in counteracting some of the diﬃculties of safety en-
gineering with COTS components across supply chains; and, its eﬀectiveness in
generating evidence which can contribute directly to the construction of safety
cases.
Keywords: Safety critical system, Commercial Oﬀ The Shelf (COTS)
components, Problem orientation
1. Introduction
Safety-critical systems are deﬁned as those systems where failure could result
in the loss of life or injury to people, damage to equipment or to the environment
[9]. Safety standards, e.g., [41, 17, 18, 6, 38], expect appropriate safety analysis
tasks to be integrated within the design and development life cycle early, iter-
atively and on an ongoing basis. Generally this is taken to mean they should
occur during the requirements capture and high level speciﬁcation phases (e.g.,
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see [29, 39, 4, 10]), and is consistent with studies that have shown that a large
proportion of anomalies occurs there [7, 22].
A challenging trend from an engineering viewpoint is the use of Commercial
Oﬀ The Shelf (COTS) (Commercial Oﬀ The Shelf) components in safety-critical
systems. COTS components ostensibly reduce costs and development time for
complex systems. However, there are obvious diﬃculties in incorporating such
‘black-box’ components in the safety critical software engineering setting, and
care is needed in the management of assumptions and expectations across supply
chains.
Other work by the second and third authors has considered the challenge of
early life cycle safety integration, leading to an approach to safety able to de-
liver early life-cycle models of requirements and high-level architectural design
amenable to a wide range of safety analyses. This work is based on Problem Ori-
ented Engineering (POE; see, for instance, [15, 14, 12]), an emerging framework
for engineering as problem solving [13]. POE has developed (since 2001) into a
collection of thought tools for the problem solving activities that underpinning
design and engineering. As such POE research encompasses both theory and
application, spanning the continuum from speculative thinking to experimen-
tation and empirical work. POE has been extensively validated in industrial
practice ([25, 26, 27, 32, 35, 28]) with increasing evidence of beneﬁcial process
improvement, which was also a concern in this study.
The work in this paper extends that eﬀort in two directions. Firstly, it
introduces and demonstrates how techniques for the explicit and incremental
consideration of safety assurance can be used as a driver for design and develop-
ment within the integrated approach, and can make a direct contribution to the
related safety case in an eﬃcient manner. Secondly, it examines the suitability
of such techniques to meet the challenges of COTS-based system safety across
supply chains, with particular focus on the establishment and communication of
assumptions, expectations and safety requirements among multiple stakeholders
and across organisational boundaries.
1.1. Paper structure
In Section 2 we review relevant background literature, with an overview of
the Case Study in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the necessary underpin-
nings of Problem Oriented Engineering necessary to understand the approach.
Sections 5 and 6 discuss, respectively, the case study and the safety case that was
developed. We discuss and evaluate outcomes from the case study in Section 7
and conclude the paper in Section 8.
2. Background
2.1. Safety cases
A safety case [1] is a documented body of evidence providing a compelling,
comprehensive and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given
application in a given environment.
A safety case should address [41]:
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• the management of risk commensurate with the potential risk posed by
the system and its complexity;
• the validity of the safety requirements, i.e., that they are derived through
thorough analysis and are traceable with respect to the system as designed
and implemented, together with evidence of their satisfaction;
• and the well-foundedness of assumptions about the system, its operating
environment or modes of use upon which the safety argument is based,
with a justiﬁcation that such assumptions are realistic and reasonable.
Standards also recommend that the safety case should contain not only ev-
idence about the product, but also the process—attesting to good practice in
development, maintenance and operation—and evidence on good engineering
judgement and design.
Although the most convincing possible safety case is one which is formally
valid and sound, Kelly and Weaver [21] observe that, due to the nature of
the evidence in safety cases, a provably valid and sound case is unobtainable.
In practice, there is wide-spread reliance on subjective expert judgement and
claims of adherence to standards. This is recognised in current safety standards,
which require only that the safety argument should be structured and evidence-
based.
However, there remain acknowledged diﬃculties in the construction of safety
cases:
• the combination of disparate pieces of the evidence, such as narrative,
requirements, claims, plans, activities or goals is complex [2];
• traditionally, safety cases are developed after design and testing leading to
the loss of in situ rationale for the safety aspects of the design and expen-
sive re-design when the current design is indefensible [20], see Figure 1.
Figure 1: The traditional view of Safety Case Development (reproduced from [20]).
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2.2. Commercial Oﬀ The Shelf Components
COTS components are commercial items sold in substantial1 quantities in
the commercial marketplace.
Since the mid 90s, there has been an increase in the use of COTS components
in safety critical systems [40, 36], motivated by a need to reduce the cost and
time pressure of development. Kelly et al. ([3]) and Lutz ([23]) both call for the
development of better methods for COTS-based systems. Their call is, however,
problematic with respect to certiﬁcation given the black-box, i.e., hidden-state,
nature of COTS components, and the fact that proprietary design information
is typically limited.
Moreover, concomitant to the increase in the use of COTS components is
a growth in complexity of the related supply chain. Menon and Kelly ([31])
observe that this poses particular challenges for the expression of safety require-
ments and their communication to multiple stakeholders across organisational
barriers whose co-operation is necessary for the safe system development. They
argue that many of these issues originate from unstated expectations or un-
justiﬁed assumptions on the part of the varied stakeholders; exposing those
assumptions during design is, therefore, desirable.
A feature of the case study discussed in the paper is the use of a variety
of COTS hardware and software components, each carrying independent safety
certiﬁcation based on civil safety standards such as IEC 61508 and DO-178B,
and supplied by diﬀerent manufacturers and system providers in a complex
supply chain.
2.3. The organisational context
At the time of the case study, the Integrated Platform Management System
(IMPS) suppler organisation, to which the ﬁrst author belonged, had adopted
a development life cycle based on the V-model and in particular the framework
outlined in the standard2 for Defense System Software Development (DoD-Std-
2167A), which followed a waterfall development process. Figure 2 gives an
overview of this model: following the agreement of the contract requirements,
further analysis was conducted to determine the hazards and risks before the
initial speciﬁcations were generated and the interfaces determined; this was
followed by a series of reviews against the design as it was developed. The
development of a system concluded with a Test Readiness Review prior to con-
ducting acceptance tests to validate the implemented solution. As shown, each
of the phases provided outputs, in the form of evidence for the safety case.
While this process is robust and repeatable, the organisation continuously
strives to operate more eﬃciently and eﬀectively with fewer resources. There-
fore, an overarching motivation for the work was to investigate how possible
improvements could be achieved through the introduction of new practices, in
this case the application of POE within the existing V-Model.
1Where substantial is market dependent.
2Now obsolete.
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Figure 2: The IMPS supplier’s adopted development model
3. Overview of the case study
3.1. The method
We take a case study approach [43] to investigate the early development life
cycle of a safety critical distributed control system, an IMPS as used in naval
vessels. A case study was deemed appropriate due to the need to investigate and
evaluate the approach in the context of a real-world safety engineering process
and in the natural organisational setting in which the process is exercised.
The speciﬁc safety critical system investigated was typical of those addressed
by the ﬁrst author’s organisation through their engineering processes, and em-
bodies speciﬁc features of interest such as the inclusion of COTS components
across a supply chain. The ﬁrst author has been involved with this type of
system for the past 10 years as both a system provider and a customer and as
such had ﬁrst-hand experience of the key issues and diﬃculties associated with
developing these complex systems.
Data were generated through the application of various POE techniques
(see Section 4) throughout the exercise of the process; a subsequent qualitative
analysis of the data was performed by the authors, where an interpretative
approach [33] was taken. An evaluation of the study and our ﬁndings is included
in Section 7.
3.2. The Purpose
The case study focuses on the problem of developing the communications
interface between the control computers of the system (the communications
interface problem). The IMPS is a safety critical distributed computing control
system, providing control and monitoring functions for systems of a naval vessel,
including propulsion, steering, electrical and auxiliary systems.
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The IMPS for a given vessel will have a number of requirements (constraints,
functional and non-functional) and in addition speciﬁc standards may be man-
dated. The development of an IMPS is generally outsourced by the shipbuilder
to an IMPS supplier, who manages the development of the system prior to in-
stallation and then provides support prior to handing operation of the vessel
and its systems to the end user.
For the IMPS under study, the contractual requirements mandated that
Defence Standard 00-56 [41] should apply. From this a key requirement is that
a safety case is prepared which provides compelling evidence that the system is
tolerably safe, and commensurate with the approaches necessary for achieving
the system’s Safety Integrity Levels (SIL).
3.3. The Challenges
The functional requirements for the system were based on the system func-
tions from previous vessels. In an eﬀort to save costs, it was decided that rather
than a bespoke solution, the system should utilise COTS hardware, such as
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)s, and associated software packages.
The COTS components used in this system carry independent safety certiﬁ-
cation based on civil safety standards such as IEC 61508 [17] and DO-178B [5].
As a consequence, the diﬀerences between these standards and Def-Stan 00-56
[41] required detailed consideration during the development phases.
One particularly problematic aspect of the IMPS was the interface between
the central PLCs and the computers used to provide an Autopilot Control Sys-
tem (ACS): the PLCs have a number of proprietary communications protocols,
none of which are available to the ACS. A need to develop a bespoke interface
to provide safety critical communications between the systems arose, but it was
unknown what the interface requirements would be and how they would be
validated. This interface is the speciﬁc focus of the case study. Issues consid-
ered include: requirements elicitation and speciﬁcation for the new technologies
being used; their management across the supply chain; integration of legacy
and new components and systems from diverse suppliers; safety veriﬁcation and
validation criteria for the components and the overall system.
3.4. System Overview
The hardware architecture (on the left of Figure 3) comprises two ACS
computers, four Local Control Loop PLCs (LCL 1-4) and two Central PLCs
(cPLCs). The ACS computers execute complex control algorithms necessary
to maintain the vessel’s positioning under numerous environmental conditions,
operating as a master/slave pair of devices in order to provide hardware redun-
dancy. LCLs 1-4 act on commands from the ACS computers to operate the
control actuators of the vessel positioning system. The local control algorithm
is closed-loop and continuously receives feedback from the actuator position
sensors. The cPLCs interface with all of the vessel’s sensors and provide this
sensor data to the ACS. This data is sent to the Human Machine Interface (HMI)
computer, which handles operator requests, such as new heading requests. The
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computers and PLCs are interconnected via an Ethernet ring, with Ethernet
switches located apporpriately in the network (not shown).
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Figure 3: Hardware (left) and Software (right) architecture
The control algorithms of the ACS are bespoke programs and execute using
a Real-Time Operating System (RTOS); the interface to the IMPS is via an
Application Speciﬁc Database (ASD), which is used to store and manage the
system parameters (input and output signals). The RTOS contains a protocol
stack, which is compatible with a number of standard protocols, for instance
TCP/IP and UDP/IP. The RTOS has also been certiﬁed for safety applications
in accordance with DO-178B.
Both Local and Central PLCs are proprietary, developed to IEC 61131-3, ex-
ecuting proprietary programs, developed using their manufacturers’ standards
compliant software tools. This also applies to the interface blocks that imple-
ment the communications protocols. The PLC has an existing communications
interface to the HMI Computer, based on ISO-TCP (RFC1006), which uses the
PLC manufacturer’s proprietary protocol, and has built-in diagnostics and so is
not available in the ACS RTOS protocol stack.
Figure 3 (right) illustrates the PLCs and ACS computers connected on a
common Ethernet bus. Each device has a network interface that handles the
communications protocols before passing the data on to the main programs.
For brevity we do not consider the design of the HMI to PLC interface in this
study.
3.4.1. System Stakeholders
The ACS and IMPS were developed by diﬀerent suppliers. A number of
stakeholders had various claims on the system from a customer and regulator
perspective (Figure 4 shows the relationship of stakeholders and lists their at-
tributes). The Shipbuilder stakeholder (1) represents a group of internal stake-
holders from Engineering (1a), Safety (1b), Supply Chain (1c) and Quality As-
surance (1d). The Shipbuilder point-of-contact in this study was Engineering
(1a) and in particular the delegated Design Authority for the IMPS. The set
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of stakeholders associated with the shipbuilder was mirrored in the IMPS and
ACS supplier organisations: i.e., for each supplier there was a Project Manager,
Technical Authority, Safety Manager and Engineers.
1a 2 34
5
6
7 8
Stakeholder relationship: 
IPMS to ACS Communications Interface 
1d1c1b
Id Stakeholder Stake Pwr Urg V.point Role Impact
1 Shipbuilder (a, b, c, d) F & E   Customer Active High
2 MoD F & E  − Client Active Medium
3 Royal Navy E − − End User Passive Low
4 IPMS Supplier F & E   Developer Active High
5 ACS Supplier F & E   Developer Active High
6 IMPS, PLC Approved
Supplier
E − − Supplier Passive Medium
7 ACT, RTOS Supplier E − − Supplier Passive Medium
8 Independent Safety
Advisor
E  − Regulator Active Medium
Notes:
1. Stake: F – Financial: gain or loss to be made, E – Ethical: an interest in the
system beyond economic
2. Pwr: Power – the ability to inﬂuence.
3. Urg: Urgency – the time sensitivity of the system development.
Figure 4: System stakeholders
3.4.2. System Requirements
The following initial requirements were elicited from suppliers.
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# Requirement Description
1 Latency The transit delay shall not cause the control system to become
unstable, or delay warnings received at the operator positions.
2 Integrity Adequate protection shall be used to ensure the data arrives in
the format it was sent.
3 Reliability Adequate protection shall be used to ensure data is not lost dur-
ing transmission.
4 Conﬁdentiality Adequate protection shall be used to ensure data is not modi-
ﬁed(!!!!!) during transmission.
5 Overhead The overheads shall be kept to a minimum, this apples to pro-
cessing time, memory usage and network bandwidth.
6 Resources The development of the interfaces must be achievable against the
available budgets and resources.
7 Support The interface shall have the capacity to support design and
growth margin retirements. As well as having a proven pedigree
that should not suﬀer through component obsolescence.
8 Non-Functional
Safety
The interface shall be commensurate with the safety standard
Def Stan 00-56 and its requirements.
Additional high-level functional safety goals were expressed by the client
(Ministry of Defence) to ensure that the vessel would remain safe under all
operational conditions. These led to the following requirements with the aim
to achieve and accurately maintain the vessel’s ordered position, each under
normal, abnormal and emergency operating conditions:
• To provide protection against the safe maximum roll angle;
• To provide an accurate measurement of vessels under keel depth for use
by operators and control systems;
• To contribute to the automated control of the vessel’s movement;
• To contribute to the maintenance of the watertight integrity of the vessel.
Finally, the following hazards were identiﬁed for the interface by the Ship-
builder and system suppliers, leading to the requirement that the system should
provide suﬃcient mitigation agains those hazards.
# Hazard Description
H1 Software error leads to an unplanned change in Control Mode, leading to a loss
of vessel control.
H2 Software error leads to the autopilot causing spurious control actuator movement,
causing potential collision or grounding.
H3 Spurious output from ACS resulting in the control actuator going to a ‘hard-
limit’ position.
H4 No demand from ACS (to control actuators) when changing ordered position.
H5 Loss of feedback from the positional sensors of the control actuator, thereby
resulting in loss of control of the vessel.
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The study focuses on the application of various POE techniques to the com-
munications interface between the PLCs of the IMPS and the computers of the
ACS. A comprehensive introduction to POE can be found in [13]; in the next
section we limit ourselves to a brief introduction of some of the basic concepts
and notation relevant to the current case study.
4. Problem Oriented Engineering
POE is an emerging framework for engineering, the creative, iterative and
often open-ended undertaking of designing and building products, systems and
processes that address real-world problems. POE is design theoretic [13], by
which we mean it provides a theory that characterises the elements of problem
solving in terms of the eﬀect they have on the process of design rather than on
an artefact. Design in POE can use many types of design activities, including
Weick’s ‘sensemaking’ [42], various formal and informal reﬁnement techniques,
Jackson’s problem progression [19], the use of architectures, etc, each of which
is captured by the eﬀect it has on design (see [13] for details).
Previous studies ([25, 26, 27]) have shown that POE3 to be a good ﬁt for
system safety. In particular, General Dynamics, UK (GDUK) has used POE
techniques in the safety-critical development of many military systems since
2007, including in the design of the stores management system for the Royal
NavyWildcat Helicopter and the Harrier JumpJet. GDUK has also used POE to
introduce requirements models amenable to safety analysis in the early stages of
their safety-critical product development process, thereby allowing early investi-
gation of safety behaviour and identiﬁcation of safety anomalies, and improving
design processes for military systems. In the case of the Wildcat Helicopter,
POE allowed the early identiﬁcation of twelve interaction issues whose resolu-
tion led to an improved design.
One contribution to knowledge of that research is the POE Safety Pattern
(PSP; [25]), shown on the right of Figure 6, a process pattern4 for capturing
high-level descriptions of system requirements and domain properties and as-
sumptions through detailed problem models coupled with their traceable and
justiﬁable step-wise transformation to speciﬁcations and high-level architec-
tural design artefacts, with the essential quality that those problem models
are amenable to various forms of safety analysis. The steps of the PSP are
described in Table 1. The use of the PSP will be discussed in detail in the case
study.
POE specialises Rogers’ deﬁnition of engineering [37] to systems engineering
as:
“Systems engineering refers to the practice of organising the de-
sign and construction of any system which transforms the physical
3Or, rather, POSE Problem Oriented Software Engineering, [14], a specialised theory for
software engineering that is embedded within POE.
4I.e., a pattern through which appropriate processes can be instantiated.
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world around us to meet some recognised need.”
As such, systems engineering becomes a problem solving exercise, the prob-
lem being, given a physical environment E , to ﬁnd the system S that meets
a real-world need N to the satisfaction of a group of stakeholders K , written
E (S) meetsK N.
Each of E , S and N are typically complex objects: E (resp. S) being formed
from a collection of domains (resp. components), with N being, perhaps, a col-
lection of use cases, user stories, requirements clauses, etc. We thus use a num-
ber of notations, graphical and otherwise, to represent and illustrate problems,
from natural language, causal calculi, program code, to a problem diagram-like
notation [19] (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: A problem diagram-like representation of the system of Figure 3. See Table 8 for a
description of the elements of this problem diagram.
A design is a sequence of solvability preserving transformations that move a
problem to known solved problems. Problem transformations relate a conclusion
problem P to a collection of premise problems, Pi , i = 1, ..., n, (n ≥ 0), via a
step rationale J .
P1 ... Pn
〈〈J〉〉
P
(1)
By identifying premise and conclusion problems, such transformations build
into design trees. Figure 7 shows the whole design tree for the case study, to be
explicated in the sequel.
During design, POE interleaves analysis in and of the problem space with
synthesis in and of the solution space:
• in the problem space, the problem is understood and agreed with validat-
ing problem stakeholders, such as the customer, domain experts, etc;
• in the solution space, a design for the solution is created and evaluated
with validating solution stakeholders, such as the regulator, end users, etc.
Within the POE ‘toolkit’, the PSP is a form of Assurance-Driven Design
(ADD; [11]) through which assurance is seen as a driving force in the design
of a system rather than as a ‘bolt-on’. ADD results from the interpretation
of Equation 1 not as a relation between a conclusion problem and a set of
premise problems mediated by a step rationale, but as a relationship between
11
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Figure 6: The POE Safety Pattern
a (conclusion, step rationale) pair and a set of premises. This places the step
rationale, and so the safety case which will be derived from it, on a par with the
solution artefact: any step towards a solution must consider both assurance and
product needs. Pressing assurance concerns, discovered during the exploration
of J0, are then allowed to drive problem solving.
5. Case study
Given the emerging importance of COTS within safety-critical system de-
velopment and that little is known about the construction of safety cases that
involve them, we speculatively investigated the application of ADD (through
the PSP) to evaluate its beneﬁts and limitations. The full development can be
read in the technical report that accompanies this paper [34]. Here, we give
some highlights of the development that form the basis of the evaluation. The
reader may wish to refer to Figure 7 throughout this section, together with ac-
companying domain descriptions (Table 8), phenomena descriptions (Table 9)
and requirements (Table 10).
All development in POE begins with the technical device that is the null
problem, Pnull . The null problem represents the existence of a problem of which
no detail is known and forms the root of a development tree, such as that in
Figure 7. As mentioned above, ADD considers a problem, step rationale pair
and so, alongside, Pnull , we must consider the initial step rationale J0. This
motivates problem exploration, by which the problem is populated, as are any
associated concerns.
5.1. Stage 1: Problem exploration
During problem exploration, the real-world domain and system requirements
were discovered, based on information gained through safety assessments and de-
sign reviews for previous vessels, as well as meetings and correspondence among
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Table 1: PSP safety steps
Stage Aim Applicable tech-
niques
Artefacts gen-
erated
Typical vali-
dating stake-
holders
Problem
Explo-
ration
To build problem mod-
els by capturing knowl-
edge of requirements
and relevant context
properties
POE Requirement
and Context Inter-
pretations
Problems,
Transforma-
tions and
Justiﬁcations
Customer; Do-
main experts
Archi
tectural
Explo-
ration
To embed high-level ar-
chitectural design in a
problem model
POE Solution
Interpretation and
Expansion
AStructs [12],
Problems,
Transformation
and Justiﬁca-
tions
Project Safety
Engineer; Inde-
pendent Safety
Expert
Problem
Refactor-
ing
To ensure readiness
of problem models
for subsequent safety
analysis
POE Problem
Progression;
various POE
Interpretations
Problems,
Transforma-
tions and
Justiﬁcations
Project Safety
Engineer; Inde-
pendent Safety
Expert
Prelimin
ary
Safety
Analysis
To apply standard
safety analysis tech-
niques to problem
models
standard safety
analysis tech-
niques (e.g.
HAZOP, FTA,
simulation)
Problems;
standard arte-
facts produced
by the ap-
plied safety
techniques
Independent
Safety Expert
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Figure 7: Development tree, from the initial ‘null’ problem. Development is upwards.
stakeholders for the IMPS under development. The outcome, P0 (see Figure 7),
reﬂects what was understood at that point in the process about the architecture
and the basic requirements for the communications interface. In particular, it
identiﬁes that the context of the development, including all PLCs, and the target
of the problem solving exercise is the design of the Communications Interface.
As part of the exploration of J0, then, we must identify the concerns that
arise during problem exploration, the discharge of which will justify the step
rationale.
In the case study, ﬁve concerns5 are discovered and must be discharged
before the ﬁnal assurance case can be said to be complete. The speciﬁc nature
of their discharge is out of scope here (but see [34] for full details): it may be
based on analysis, expert review, etc, as in the case of three of the identiﬁed
concerns, or may require further exploration of the problem or solution as is the
case, for instance, with the discharge of hazards. They are:
5Including various standard concerns; see [24] for details.
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Domain Description
Autopilot Con-
trol System
(ACS)
The computer responsible for issuing control orders based on an opera-
tor requested set-point, feedback position indications and the output of
a control algorithm. This is a COTS computer and runs a proprietary
RTOS. Its application program is to be developed by the ACS supplier.
Central Pro-
grammable Logic
Controller (Cen-
tral PLC)
The Central PLC responsible for data acquisition and distribution from
the operator and ﬁeld inputs. This is a COTS PLC and runs a propri-
etary operating system. The PLC program is to be developed by the
IMPS supplier.
Local Controller
(LCL PLC)
A local PLC responsible for providing local actuation of control valves
based on demands of the Navigation Control System. This is a COTS
PLC and runs a proprietary operating system. The PLC program is
to be developed by the IMPS supplier.
Ethernet Communications medium between all the computers.
Helmsman The operating position responsible for distributing requests for changes
in course and also monitoring the vessel’s position. (The helmsman
interacts with the system through the HMI Computer, a connection
domain abstracted away in this analysis.)
Communications
Interface
The interface to be designed
Figure 8: Domains descriptions for Figure 7.
Phenomenon Description
Control orders New demand signals
Feedback Feedback position signal from the control actuator
Setpoint changes Operator entered requests for a new vessel position
Warnings Warnings alerting the helmsman that a demand has failed
Sensor Data Signals for position and speed of the vessel
Figure 9: Phenomena descriptions for Figure 7.
Requirement Description
R.a The ACS shall transmit orders to the LCL PLCs.
R.b The LCL PLCs shall provide actuator feedback information to the
ACS.
R.c The Central PLC shall provide sensor data to the ACS.
R.d The ACS shall send warning information to the Central PLC for display
at the HMI.
R.e The HMI shall transmit Operator set-point changes to the ACS via the
Central PLC.
R.f Network diagnostic information shall be made available to the ACS
and Central PLC.
Figure 10: Requirements descriptions for Figure 7.
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Step from Pnull to P0: Design Space
Justification J0: The problem model of Figure 5, including the problem di-
agram and its associated descriptions, is the result of an evaluation of the real-
world environment and the system requirements, informed by safety assessments
and design reviews for previous vessels, and by meetings and correspondence among
stakeholders of the system under development. POE context interpretation classed
each device as a domain, while POE requirement interpretation led to the stated
requirements R.a to R.f.
Concern: C1: Interpretation Concern
Status: Discharged
Claim: The interpretations are well-founded
Argument & Evidence: The choice of domains follows from the vessel func-
tions, legacy system architecture and components that are being replaced by
COTS components, and the need for a communications medium (Ethernet) en-
abling the Communications Interface.
Concern: C2: Hazard Identiﬁcation Concern
Status: Pending
Claim: Suﬃcient hazard identiﬁcation has been conducted
Argument & Evidence: Hazards have been determined by the Shipbuilder
and system suppliers (H1 to H5) and are captured in their Hazard Log. However,
this concern cannot be discharged until the solution has been assessed.
Risks: All hazards are not identiﬁed
Concern: C3: Hardware Reliability Concern
Status: Discharged
Claim: Hardware reliability is commensurate with the target safety level
Argument & Evidence: The IMPS supplier has developed Reliability Block
Diagrams for the hardware architecture in the scope of their supply. The results
of this analysis show that the system has a Probability of a Dangerous Failure in
excess of the requirement for a SIL 2 system.
Concern: C4: Network Topology Concern
Status: Discharged
Claim: Network Topology is robust enough to support the communications in-
terface
Argument & Evidence: The IMPS supplier has held and passed a prelim-
inary design review to assess the requirement of the network, which established
that a standard Ethernet network shall be provided. The individual hardware
components have been assessed at design reviews and have undergone factory ac-
ceptance testing as standalone items. The hardware has subsequently been deliv-
ered to the shipbuilder for integration into the vessel. An independent assessment
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of the network was conducted by two independent advisors; their recommenda-
tions have been implemented where practicable. The shipbuilder has conducted a
vulnerability assessment on the network components outside the scope of supply
of the IMPS supplier: this resulted in a need to re- route the network to avoid
critical failures in the event of loss of power.
Concern: C5: Communications Interface Concern
Status: Pending
Claim: The communications interface meets the requirements of the system
Risks: The solution does not provide the necessary Quality of Service. The
solution cannot be implemented and tested with the available resources. Evidence
cannot be generated to support the safety case. The implemented interface does
not mitigate against the identiﬁed hazards (H1 to H5).
The two pending concerns, C2 and C5, trigger the following exploration steps
to establish a candidate solution software architecture driven by its validation
criteria.
5.2. Stage 2: Solution exploration
This step consists of an assurance-driven exploration of the solution to be
designed and its architecture, which results in problem P1.2 and justiﬁcation
J1, with one component for each choice: J1.1, J1.2, and J1.3. Substantial eﬀort
in this step consists of work in the validation space to form and analyse the
justiﬁcations. Full details are contained in [34]; here we describe only the most
salient features.
5.2.1. Diagnostics, testing and proof
The communications interface development was to be conducted in accor-
dance with the processes and techniques required to achieve SIL 2. Therefore,
the same level of evidence was required in terms of the requirements, design
and test documents, and this evidence needed formally documenting by the
suppliers.
To implement a ﬁt-for-purpose bespoke solution and provide safety justiﬁ-
cation (hence addressing concern C5) the stakeholders agreed that appropriate
levels of diagnostics, testing and proof should be mutually agreed between the
shipbuilder, the IMPS supplier and the ACS supplier.
Diagnostics were required to ensure the reliability, integrity and security of
the communications interface, as the Quality of Service of the communications
can cause control system instability
The level of testing had to be suﬃcient to demonstrate that the communica-
tions interface was robust enough for the volumes and types of data transmitted
and received across the entire IMPS network.
This is captured in the step rationale in which new concerns were derived
from C5:
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C6 Level of Diagnostic: The level of diagnostics is suﬃcient to ensure the
reliability, integrity and security of the data. Status: Pending
C7 Level of Testing: The level of testing is suﬃcient to ensure the quality,
safety and performance of the selected protocol. Status: Pending
C8 Level of Proof: The level of proof is suﬃcient to meet the safety require-
ments of the system. Status: Pending.
C9 Response Time: The allowable time for a message to take to transmit from
one device to another is set so not to aﬀect the stability of the controllers.
Status: Pending
C10 Reliability: The allowable number of lost messages during transmission of
data is set so not to aﬀect the stability of the controllers. Status: Pending
We note that, as might be expected, all concerns in this step are pending
the solution; the nature of ADD encourages the discharge of these concerns to
drive the development of that solution: for instance in the case of C8, we might
anticipate that SIL 2 level of evidence will be required from the suppliers, and
this establishes key constraints by which the solutions delivered will be validated.
Without knowledge of the concerns, such constraints and other requirements
may be lost during development.
5.2.2. Architectural interpretations and expansion
Having established key validation criteria for the solution, three candidate
architectures for the communications interface were assessed. The outcome is
that a bespoke common communications protocol is to adopted and developed
by both suppliers, with the choice being between a proprietary ISO-TCP pro-
tocol, versus one developed over UDP/IP or TCP/IP.
Step justiﬁcation J1 was developed, pending concerns for which led to the
architecture shown in Figure 11, based on the standard UDP protocol. For more
details of the choice, see [34].
Communications Interface
UDP/IP InterfaceBespoke Protocol
Figure 11: The chosen UDP-based candidate architecture
This step introduced one further concern:
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C13.2 Solution Feasibility: The solution can be implemented by both suppliers
and provides a suitable protocol in terms of the identiﬁed requirements.
Discharged, due to the use of the standard UDP protocol.
5.3. Stage 3: Problem Refactoring
Problem refactoring ensures PSA readiness, i.e., to make sure that the prob-
lem model is in a form which allows the necessary PSA to be conducted. In this
case study, this entailed some validation work related to establishing values for
the diagnostic parameters which are the subjects of concerns C9–C12, coupled
with a re-interpretation of the requirements to bring such values into the design
space. (Examples of more complex transformations are given in safety critical
developments reported in [24]).
This led to concerns C9: Response time, C10: Reliability, C11: Frequency,
and C12: Length, all of which were discharged through the estimation of network
parameters through simulation, done as part of the justiﬁcation step.
5.3.1. Requirements interpretation
With the validation parameters set, the requirements were then interpreted
to bring them into the design space, adding R.g through R.j as follows, and
leading to problem P2 in Figure 7, the last we consider here:
R.g Message size shall be limited to 240 bytes (constraint of the PLC commu-
nication block).
R.h Maximum system latency shall not exceed 800ms (this is a combined la-
tency for the feed-forward and feedback paths).
R.i Maximum packet loss shall not exceed 5 packets.
R.j Message frequency shall be set to 5Hz (200ms).
and the solution feasibility concern (C13.2) was reﬁned accordingly, to
C13.2.1 Solution Feasibility: The requirements speciﬁed shall enable the develop-
ment of a robust, reliable and secure interface that supports the control
system.
which remains pending.
5.4. Stage 4: Preliminary Safety Analysis
As already mentioned, the aim of Preliminary Safety Analysis (PSA) is to:
• conﬁrm any relevant hazards from the system level hazard list;
• identify if further hazards need adding to the list; and
• analyse the chosen architecture to validate that it can satisfy the safety
targets associated with the identiﬁed relevant hazards.
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A number of techniques can be applied to perform a PSA: for instance, Man-
nering [24] applies both FTA and HAZOP.
We have already seen how applicable hazards H1 to H5 were identiﬁed from
previous vessels (see Section 3.4.2). In order to identify further possible hazards
and gain stakeholder approval, a HAZOP study was conducted (see, for instance,
[30]). The selection of HAZOP guidewords and the choice of material to be used
in the case study was part of the HAZOP preparation and was based on the
understanding of the interface gained during the application of PSP.
For brevity and given it is a standard technique, we provide only a brief
summary of the PSA HAZOP. The HAZOP was conducted as a workshop with
the key stakeholders, with relevant supporting documents provided to the par-
ticipants prior to the workshop. The HAZOP was based on the problem charac-
terisation given in P2. The objective was to assess the hazards associated with
any failures and their impact on the system and its environment. The outcome
of that PSA HAZOP was that no further hazards were identiﬁed beyond H1 to
H5.
The PSA also aided the assessment of concerns C9 to C12, associated with
the set levels of diagnostics, and made a number of recommendations for safe-
guards to be implemented. From this assessment, further requirements for the
diagnostics were derived and included in the interface speciﬁcation to undergo
further reviews by the stakeholders. The safeguards are captured in the follow-
ing steps:
Step Preliminary Safety Analysis: Validation space
Justification J2.1: The PSA assessed concerns C9 to C12 and made a num-
ber of recommendations for safeguards to be implemented. Here is the full step
justiﬁcation:
Concern: C14: Safeguards
Status: Pending
Claim: Appropriate safeguards are implemented
Argument & Evidence: It is expected that the following safeguards will be
implemented in the application and session layers of the communications interface:
• Monitor the health of the receiving and transmitting nodes, using a commu-
nications heartbeat signal between the nodes.
• Send next order after predetermined period (set to 200ms).
• Generate an operator warning when a node is not communicating (Node
Down Warning).
• Apply a timestamp to each message, and reject old messages.
• Generate an operator warning when the measured value deviates from the
ordered value (Set-point Error Warning).
• Implement a limited number of message resends to a node based on the
frequency and lost packet requirements.
• Apply a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to each message.
• HMI should receive feedback from ACS before displaying new values.
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• Perform signal comparisons between redundant hardware and raise warnings
if diﬀerences are detected (Signal Deviation Warning).
6. Safety case
Based on the original SIL assessments for the case study, Def-Stan 00-56
places the IMPS and ACS as ‘Medium’ integrity systems. For this level of
integrity of the communications interface, the evidence should be provided as a
safety case and be able to show that:
• safety requirements are deﬁned, correct and suﬃcient to maintain the
safety of the system;
• hazards have been identiﬁed and assessed and risk reduction carried out;
• the domains external to the interface in which data is manipulated has
been subject to hazard analysis;
• hazards that could adversely aﬀect the integrity of the interface have been
controlled via the deﬁnition of safety requirements for the operational
processes that manipulate data.
The raw evidence generated throughout the development was extensive, in-
cluding large amounts of test evidence, review evidence, quality assurance evi-
dence, as well as the deliverable items, much of which is contained in [34].
The overarching safety justiﬁcation for the IMPS (covering both hardware
and software) was a product- and process-based argument in order to meet
the requirements of Def-Stan 00-56 that the IMPS was tolerably safe. Def-
Stan 00-56 deﬁnes tolerable as a level of risk between broadly acceptable and
unacceptable that may be tolerated when it has been demonstrated to be As
Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). For the IMPS this meant that all
individual hazards were documented and the associated risks were demonstrated
to be acceptable, and a robust argument provided that the IMPS was justiﬁed
against the Safety Roles identiﬁed in Section 3.4.2. As a consequence a GSN
argument was constructed, following a top-down approach, to argue that the
IMPS was tolerably safe.
Note that the concerns raised during the PSP process identiﬁed three main
areas that needed to be addressed. The ﬁrst concern, associated with the level of
diagnostics for the interface, was progressed through to conclusion by recursively
applying PSP as indicated in the previous section, and resulted in a set of
requirements that allowed development work to commence. The second and
third requirements concerned the level of testing of the system, hence were
not addressed by PSP, but instead provided a focus for integrating PSP work
into the wider safety justiﬁcations for the interconnected systems, and as such
aided the development of their respective safety cases: even though exhaustive
testing of the interface will not be possible, an approach was planned to provide
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suﬃcient test coverage to discharge the stakeholder concerns, captured through
the inclusion of GSN goals for an agreed set of test plans and procedures. This
allowed the suppliers to test their standalone systems prior to integrating the
systems and conducting the acceptance tests using IMPS test environment.
Furthermore, the tests to discharge the ﬁnal stakeholder concerns were focused
on the hazards and risks identiﬁed during the PSP activities.
As the communications interface was developed by two separate organisa-
tions with diﬀering software processes and tools, a modular approach to the
safety case was deemed appropriate. The modular approach related the com-
munications interface safety argument to the safety arguments for both the ACS
and IMPS, as they all contribute to the overall Vessel Safety Case. The mod-
ular approach to creating the safety argument began with creating modules in
the safety case for each of the software modules in the software architecture,
then deﬁning the top-level argument that is to be justiﬁed. The modular top-
level argument for the case study is shown in Figure 12. The ‘IFSafe’ module
is the contract module (based on the GSN extensions discussed by [8]), and a
Safety Case Contract was used to record the dependencies that existed between
the safety argument modules (within the ﬁgure, for brevity, only the contract
between the IMPSSafe and IFSafe modules is shown). The organisation respon-
sible for overseeing these contracts was the shipbuilder.
Further detail of the safety case is given in [34].
7. Discussion and evaluation
In this study, we have investigated how the assurance needs of a safety-
critical development can use to drive the early life cycle of a live project for the
development of an IPSM used on naval vessels. The system was a safety-critical
distributed control system, which was developed in the context of the normal
engineering practice of the IPSM supplier organisation. A particular challenge
on this project, which was the focus of the case study, was the development
of the communications interface, due to the need to integrate legacy and new
components, making use of COTS components across a supply chain. The four
steps of the PSP were applied iteratively in the context of the V-model process
adopted by the IPSM supplier organisation.
In this section we discuss the outcome of the case study in view of the work’s
set objectives.
7.1. Suitability for systems engineering practice
The case study has demonstrated that applying ADD resulted in a veriﬁed
solution, which links to the V&V activities associated with the V-model, in the
normal exercise of the process in an industrial context.
It was shown that the approach had the ability to:
• engage various stakeholders and capture their participation throughout
the analysis, speciﬁcation and design stages related to the V-model;
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Figure 12: Top Level Argument with Safety Contract
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• capture the stakeholder requirements and provide rich traceability [16] of
the solution in the form of transformation diagrams and structured prose;
• lead, through stakeholder participation, to a validated solution with an
agreed safety justiﬁcation.
Therefore, the outcome of this case study contributes to the growing body
of evidence concerning the ability of the approach to combine eﬀectively with
safety practice.
7.2. Working within supply chains
The ability of the approach to engage various stakeholders and capture their
participation throughout the analysis, speciﬁcation and design stages of the pro-
cess was considered a key success factor in this case study, where the complexity
of the engineering task was compounded by the need to communicate knowl-
edge and reach a common understanding among diverse stakeholders across the
supply chain.
PSP data was collected with the aid of stakeholders from diﬀerent organi-
sations, and, while misinterpretations are always possible and a total guarantee
that the speciﬁcation is error free is unachievable, the involvement of the stake-
holders in validating the PSP justiﬁcations, and in conducting the PSA provided
a high level of assurance as to the soundness of the data.
The approach was eﬀective in identifying, expressing and sharing appropri-
ate safety requirements across the supply chain, making explicit and justifying
key assumptions, and allowing for appropriate consideration of the various certi-
ﬁcation standards and the generation of supporting evidence for the safety case.
Therefore, it demonstrated that the approach can contribute directly to mitigat-
ing the challenges acknowledged by Menon and Kelly [31], by avoiding unstated
expectations or unjustiﬁed assumptions on the part of the varied stakeholders.
7.3. Contribution to safety cases
The PSP and GSN were conceived to perform diﬀerent functions: the PSP
to support software development for safety-critical applications by exploiting
POE techniques to solve engineering problems, while GSN to develop safety ar-
guments. Also, the PSP activities are fully integrated within the chosen devel-
opment process, while GSN allows one to create the safety arguments alongside,
but separately from, the chosen software development method.
Each approach can beneﬁt the development process. The PSP engenders
stakeholder participation, promotes the continuous validation of problem and
solution artefacts, allows for structured prose to record critical parts of justiﬁca-
tions; also, hazard and risk identiﬁcation is inherent to the process, and design
trees and transformation diagrams provide a traceable development, from prob-
lem to solution. However, the PSP is not widely known or used by the safety
community.
On the other hand, GSN allows for a structured hierarchical breakdown of
the safety case which captures the most important aspects of safety arguments,
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can be used during various stages of argument development, is semantically
well deﬁned and understood — a standard has been drafted, and is increasingly
being adopted by organisations in various industries. However, GSN is diﬃcult
to write (but easy to read), does not prevent bad arguments being created, and
can be subjective due to the lack of stakeholder endorsement throughout the
process.
As a consequence, in the case study, we chose to combine the two with a
view to capitalise on their relative strengths, with the outcome that the PSP
has allowed for stakeholder participation culminating in a validated solution
with an agreed safety justiﬁcation, with GSN providing a clear overarching
structure for the safety argument within which evidence from the PSP could be
integrated alongside other forms of evidence, and providing a route to address
the stakeholder concerns associated with levels of evidence and testing. The
result of this integration was a product and process based safety argument
for the communications interface, which in turn created a safety contract for
the suppliers and shipbuilder, thus ensuring each organisation’s obligations are
fulﬁlled.
Note that there are some limitations and sparse information on how to con-
struct these contracts in a tabular form, as discussed by [8] and also experienced
in this case study. That said, for the purpose of managing the interface between
the two suppliers this approach did have its beneﬁts, especially when ensuring
that each supplier was aware of their obligations.
7.4. Threats to Validity
Above we claim that our approach is engaging for stakeholders, oﬀers rich
traceability, led to validated solutions and aided in communications. External
validity concerns the problem of knowing whether a case study is generalisable.
The ﬁndings we have presented argue, from a single case study and, unfortu-
nately, the opportunities for doing so within the same sector are few and far
between: our research depends on the availability of a practitioner/domain ex-
pert with problems to solve and a willingness to explore new approaches to doing
so. However, as Yin counsels [43], case studies rely on analytic generalisation,
where the investigator is ‘striving to generalize a particular set of results to some
broader [context].’ and in that broader context, we ﬁnd that our approach has
these characteristics is a repeated conclusion of other case studies that we have
conducted both with the safety-critical systems industry and in other sectors,
for instance, [24, 32, 28]. Given the generality of the approach and its domain
independence, we have some small conﬁdence that these general conclusions will
hold broadly across engineering disciplines.
Having said that, however, this case study can be seen as reapplying the
work of Mannering ([24]) which argues that that work provides an operational
basis for conducting research in this area. I.e., given the availability of similar
case studies, we have some conﬁdence that the experimental procedure followed
here is repeatable.
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8. Conclusion
This study has successfully applied the PSP in the context of industrial
practice and contributed to a growing body of evidence of the beneﬁts of doing
so. However, given the limited scope and timescale of the case study, the re-
sults, whilst encouraging, remain preliminary and fall short from introducing a
paradigm shift in how safety software and cases are produced. Further research
research is needed, particularly in the following areas.
Further applications of the approach in within safety practice would be bene-
ﬁcial, both to problems of growing complexity and in the context of organisations
adopting diverse development approaches. Such research would produce further
evidence of the applicability and eﬀectiveness of the approach, could be used
to draw comparisons and further validate the ﬁndings of this investigation, and
could further promote the use of the PSP within the software safety community.
Besides GSN, alternative methods for creating safety arguments exist; fur-
ther studies could compare and contrast these methods and investigate to which
extent the PSP is compatible with them. This could also be further expanded
to look for patterns for the re-use of safety arguments, with the aim of making
the safety case development process more eﬃcient.
Another possible line of enquiry concerns the development of a PSP stan-
dard, which provides clear guidelines on how to conduct the activities and also
provides guidance on presenting the outcomes in the form of a safety case, with
or without reliance on other methods (such as GSN). These could also be ac-
companied by software tool support or drawing templates for use in existing
software packages.
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